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____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge.

In this diversity case appellant Susan R. Lindsey
("Lindsey"), a licensed real estate agent, appeals an order of
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
granting summary judgment in favor of her former employer,
appellees M. A. Zeccola & Sons, Inc. and Michael A. Zeccola
(collectively and individually "Zeccola").

She asserts the

district court erred in concluding the statute of frauds barred
her claim for breach of an eighteen month employment contract.
Lindsey also asserts the court erred in concluding the one year
statute of limitations barred her claim for a sales commission.
She contends a three year statute of limitations which would not
bar her claim applies.
We hold the district court correctly concluded
Delaware's statute of frauds barred Lindsey's breach of contract
claim and we will affirm that part of its order.

We agree with

Lindsey, however, that the district court should have applied the
three year statute of limitations to her commission claim.

We

will therefore reverse the part of the district court's order
granting summary judgment to Zeccola on Lindsey's claim for a
sales commission.0
0

Lindsey also argues the district court erred in dismissing her
claims for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. We hold Lindsey's arguments concerning these
3

I.

Statement of Facts and Procedural History

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to
Lindsey, follow.

In 1989, Zeccola sought to hire a person to

sell homes at its development in Hampton Pointe, Delaware
("Hampton Pointe").

At the time, Lindsey worked for another

broker on a straight commission basis but was looking for a
position which would provide her with a steadier income.
Lindsey and Michael Zeccola first met at Zeccola's home
in November of 1989.

They next met at Zeccola's Hampton Pointe

office on November 29, 1989 and discussed benefits, salary and
commission.

Lindsey informed Zeccola she was not willing to work

weekends and Zeccola responded he did not expect her to do so.
Zeccola handed Lindsey a typed document containing the terms of
proposed employment.

The document proposed alternative terms of

a weekly salary plus commission, or a straight commission with
weekly draws against commission.

Lindsey told Zeccola neither

proposal was acceptable.
Lindsey and Zeccola met again on December 4, 1989 at
the Hampton Pointe office.

Zeccola handed Lindsey a one-page,

handwritten proposal headed "calculated on 18 month's,"0
containing the word "Susan," Lindsey's telephone number and the
date "1/24/90" across the top.

Appendix ("App.") at 2.

Below

claims lack merit. Therefore, we will affirm the district
court's order dismissing them.
0
The apostrophe noting the possessive case in the heading is a
grammatical error unless it was meant to limit a missing term
such as "salary." As we conclude infra in Part III, it is
ambiguous in either case.
4

this information were two columns, each describing a different
pay option.

Lindsey testified at her deposition that Zeccola,

when he presented the proposal to her, said "this is a contract
for 18 months, and this is what I am willing to pay you [left
column].

This [right column] is what you wanted, and this [left

column] is what I am willing to pay."

Lindsey v. M. A. Zeccola &

Sons, Inc., No. 92-283-SLR, slip op. at 2 (D. Del. May 24, 1993).
Lindsey testified she responded that she "accepted that contract
[the left column] for 18 months of employment at that salary and
those terms."
proposal.

Id.

Neither Lindsey nor Zeccola signed the

Lindsey also says they discussed weekend work and

Zeccola understood that she was not going to work every weekend
because "our original plan was that I was to have off every other
weekend."

Id. at 3.
Lindsey began working for Zeccola on February 2, 1990.

Lindsey testified her hours were Monday through Thursday 1:00
p.m. to 5:00 p.m., with Fridays off and work on weekends from
either 11:00 a.m. or 12:00 noon to either 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.
Lindsey claims she procured buyers for a home in Hampton Pointe.
On May 3, 1990 the buyers, Rakesh K. and Beeny Gupta
(collectively the "Guptas") signed a sales contract, conditioned
on their ability to obtain certain financing arrangements.
Zeccola fired Lindsey on May 17, 1990, allegedly because Lindsey
did not work in April on either Easter weekend or the weekend
thereafter.

On November 28, 1990, Zeccola and the Guptas held a

settlement meeting and the Hampton Pointe sale was closed.
Lindsey received no commission.
5

On May 12, 1992 Lindsey, a Pennsylvania resident, filed
suit against Zeccola, a Delaware resident, claiming damages in
excess of $50,000 for breach of contract, wrongful discharge and
emotional distress.

Zeccola denied the existence of any

employment contract beyond one for employment at-will and moved
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) or for summary judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

The district court granted Zeccola's

motion for summary judgment as to all claims on May 24, 1993.
Lindsey filed a timely notice of appeal on June 17, 1993.

II.

Statement of Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over

this diversity case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1993).
We have appellate jurisdiction over the district court's final
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).
substantive law of the forum state, Delaware.0

We apply the

Clark v. Modern

Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993).
When reviewing an order granting summary judgment we
exercise plenary review and apply the same principles the
district court should have initially applied.

Under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(c), we ask whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Gray v. York

Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992).
0

We view

Neither party argues that choice of law principles indicate any
law other than that of the forum should apply.
6

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
draw all inferences in that party's favor.

Id.

The evidence,

however, must be sufficient for a jury to return a verdict in
favor of the nonmoving party; if it is merely colorable or not
significantly probative, the court should grant summary judgment.
Id.

III.

The Statute of Frauds Issue

Lindsey argues that the district court erred in
concluding her breach of contract claim was barred by Delaware's
statute of frauds. It provides:
§ 2714. Necessity of writing for contracts;
definition of writing; evidence.
(a) No action shall be brought to
charge any person upon any agreement . . .
that is not to be performed within the space
of one year from the making thereof . . .
unless the contract is reduced to writing, or
some memorandum, or notes thereof, are signed
by the party to be charged therewith, or some
other person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized in writing . . . .

Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2714(a) (1993).0
Lindsey argues the statute is satisfied by five written
documents when they are considered together with the parties'
testimony and other evidence and that her part performance brings
this eighteen month contract within the part performance
0

The statute of frauds applies to employment contracts which
"cannot possibly be performed within one year." Kirschling v.
Lake Forest Sch. Dist., 687 F. Supp. 927, 930 (D. Del. 1988)
(citation omitted). Lindsey alleges her contract was for
eighteen months.
7

exception to the statute.

The five documents include the two

written proposals; Lindsey's federal employment eligibility
verification form; a document containing copies of Lindsey's pay
stubs and canceled pay checks; and a document containing copies
of canceled checks drawn on Zeccola's account for health
insurance reimbursements that were signed by him and made payable
to Lindsey.
In Delaware a collection of several writings, only one
of which is signed, may satisfy the Delaware statute of frauds.
Abramson v. Delrose, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 440, 442 (D. Del. 1955).
In determining whether any particular writing or writings satisfy
the statute, Delaware relies on section 131 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts which requires that at least one of the
writings be signed by the party to be charged and that all the
writings taken together:
(a) reasonably identif[y] the subject
matter of the contract,
(b) [are] sufficient to indicate that a
contract with respect thereto has been made
between the parties or offered by the signer
to the other party, and
(c) state[] with reasonable certainty
the essential terms of the unperformed
promises in the contract.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 131 (1981); see Kirschling v.
Lake Forest Sch. Dist., 687 F. Supp. 927, 931 (D. Del. 1988).
It is undisputed that Zeccola's signature appears on
some of the five documents.

The dispute is over the other three

requirements of Restatement section 131.
8

After the district

court reviewed all the documents, it held that none of them,
singly or together, sufficiently identified the subject matter,
duration, job description or hours of employment with the
precision needed to satisfy the statute:
Plaintiff's first unsigned document
. . . contains two different salary
proposals. Since plaintiff did not accept
either of these proposals, it cannot be
considered as identifying the subject matter
of the contract. Plaintiff's second unsigned
document . . . also sets forth two salary
proposals. Although plaintiff eventually
accepted one of the two proposals on this
page, the document standing alone is
deficient since 1) defendant did not sign it
and 2) it fails to set forth any specific
terms of employment. Moreover, the notation
"calculated on 18 month's" does not
conclusively demonstrate an offer for an 18month contract.
Plaintiff's employment verification form
. . . payroll records . . . and canceled
checks for health insurance . . . all fail to
provide job description, hours or other terms
of employment. Moreover, none of these three
documents contain any internal or direct
connection with each other or with the first
two documents.

Lindsey, slip op. at 7.
Lindsey argues that the district court erred in making
these determinations.
Restatement.

She relies heavily on section 132 of the

It states "[t]he memorandum may consist of several

writings if one of the writings is signed and the writings in the
circumstances clearly indicate that they relate to the same
transaction."

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 132 (1981).

Lindsey stresses illustration five.

9

It states:

A agrees orally to employ B for two years. An
unsigned memorandum of the contract, stating
its terms, is prepared at A's direction.
Later B begins work and payroll cards are
made and initialed by A which state some of
the terms but not the duration of the
employment. If it is clear that the unsigned
memorandum and the payroll cards refer to the
same agreement, they may be read together as
a sufficient memorandum to charge A.

Id. at § 132 cmt. c, illus. 5.

This illustration is drawn from

Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y.
1952).

Id. at § 132 reporter's note.

In Crabtree the documents

at issue included two payroll cards signed by the defendant's
agents.

They contained the parties' names, plaintiff's position

and his salary.

Crabtree, 110 N.E.2d at 553.

Significantly, the

second payroll card, prepared by defendant's comptroller at
plaintiff's insistence that the original agreement entitled him
to a pay raise, noted "'Salary increase per contractual
arrangements with [the defendant.]'"

Id. at 555.

The court

found this statement "certainly constitutes a reference of sorts
to a more comprehensive 'arrangement . . . .'"

Id. at 555.

It

therefore considered parol evidence to show defendant's consent
to the terms of the unsigned office memorandum.

Id.

Reasoning

that a sufficient connection between writings is established by a
clear reference in them to the same subject matter or
transaction, the court found all three documents at issue
"refer[red] on their face to the same transaction" because all of
the information contained in the office memorandum was entirely
consistent with the detailed information in the payroll cards, so

10

that "it is hardly possible that such detailed information could
refer to another or a different agreement."

Id. at 554-55.

In Crabtree the term of employment at issue was the
length of the contract.

Id. at 555.

The court decided the

unsigned memorandum's notation "two years to make good"
designated the term of employment.

Id.

The court concluded this

notation could not be given meaning unless it was read as a
reference to the duration of employment.

To the extent the

statement was ambiguous, the New York court concluded that it
could consider parol evidence to interpret its meaning.

Id.

The

Crabtree court reasoned "[w]hat purpose, other than to denote the
length of the contract term, such a notation could have, is hard
to imagine."

Id.

Unless the notation were meaningless, the

court had to relate it to the length of the employment contract.
Id.

After considering the wage scale, the plaintiff's periodic

pay increases, the parties' relationship, the course of
negotiations and the plaintiff's insistence upon employment
security, the court found "the purpose of the phrase . . . was to
grant plaintiff the tenure he desired."

Id.

We, like the district court, believe that Crabtree is
distinguishable.

In Crabtree each of the two signed payroll

cards contained all but one of the essential terms of the
employment contract and the terms embodied in the payroll cards
exactly matched the terms in the unsigned office memorandum.0 We
do not have such specific and unequivocal evidence here.
0

The

This is also true of the facts in illustration five to section
132 of the Restatement.
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signed documents we have are a Department of Justice Employment
Eligibility Form I-9 ("Form I-9"), canceled payroll checks and
canceled health insurance reimbursement checks.

They do not

describe Lindsey's job or her work hours, and none of them
"clearly indicate that they relate to the same transaction."
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 132.

Form I-9 is dated

February 6, 1990 and is signed by Lindsey and Robert Cook,
Zeccola's bookkeeper.

It provides no employment terms but simply

verifies Lindsey's eligibility to work in the United States.

It

contains no reference to any of the other documents and does not
even show that Lindsey was employed by Zeccola.
The weekly payroll checks starting February 8, 1990 and
ending May 17, 1990 are signed by Michael or Lawrence Zeccola and
show Lindsey received a net pay of $481.84 per week.

The

corresponding pay stubs show a weekly gross pay of $647.00.
Lindsey's weekly gross or net pay, multiplied by the seventyeight weeks that make up an eighteen month term, does not match
any of the three salary figures Zeccola offered her in the two
written proposals.0

The pay checks and stubs show that Lindsey

worked for Zeccola from February to May 1990 but they do not show
her position, hours or term of employment.0
0

The documents at issue purportedly offer salaries of $31,200.00,
$50,400.00 and $52,500.00. Lindsey's weekly net pay of $481.84
multiplied by seventy-eight weeks equals $37,583.52. Her gross
pay of $647.00 multiplied by seventy-eight weeks equals
$50,466.00. While some of the numbers are close, neither
Lindsey's gross pay nor her net weekly pay match any of the
proposed salaries Zeccola offered her.
0
One of the pay stubs appears to show the number "40.00" under
the area marked "Date." This number could relate to forty hours
per week, but the reproduction is poor and we are unable to tell
12

The two checks Michael Zeccola made payable to Lindsey
to reimburse health insurance premiums which Lindsey had advanced
pose the same problem as the payroll checks.

Lindsey says they

show the parties' performance was in accord with the provision
for health insurance in the second written proposal Zeccola
offered her, but the amounts of these checks, $886.40 and
$289.26, are not shown to have any relation to the $9,000.00
figure opposite the notation "insurance."

App. at 2.

Neither

the checks nor the insurance premium notices show Lindsey's
position, hours, salary or duration of employment.
Accordingly, Lindsey's argument that these checks, read
together with the two written proposals, disclose all the
essential terms of her contract fails.

They do not show Lindsey

had a position whose hours, fringes, or salary coincided with any
of Zeccola's offers.

They do not help us tell which of the three

proposals memorializes the essential terms of the employment
contract the parties finally agreed upon.
Lindsey argues, however, that the only real dispute in
this case concerns the length of the employment contract and that
the eighteen month term is evidenced in writing by the statement
"calculated on 18 month's" which heads both columns of the second
proposal.

App. at 2.

Unless this statement clearly and

explicitly identifies the length of employment as eighteen
months, Delaware's presumption in favor of employment at-will
what the "40.00" represents. This notation on the stubs does not
correspond to her testimony that she worked approximately 34-36
hours per week. Even if it could be interpreted to indicate her
hours per week, our conclusion would not be changed.
13

comes into play to defeat Lindsey's claim.

"Delaware Courts will

not hold an employment relationship to be anything but at-will
absent clear and explicit terms providing otherwise."

Mann v.

Cargill Poultry, Inc., No. 88C-AU37, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 225,
at *22 (June 13, 1990), aff'd, 584 A.2d 1228 (Del. 1990); see
Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 102 (Del. 1992)
("[Delaware] law provides a heavy presumption that a contract for
employment, unless otherwise expressly stated, is at-will in
nature, with duration indefinite.") (citation omitted).
With this presumption in mind, we consider the
statement "calculated on 18 month's."

We note it is underlined

and appears near the top of the page; directly beneath it are two
columns, one beginning "salary (2,800 per mo) 50,400" and the
other beginning "Susan," and underneath that "(2,916 per mo)
52,500."

App. at 2.

Zeccola asserts that the statement merely

explains how the calculations of earnings were done.

Lindsey

admitted that the eighteen month period involved in the
calculations was based on the time the parties estimated that it
would take to sell-out the Hampton Pointe project.

We believe

the calculations could likewise imply either that the contract
was for eighteen months, as Lindsey argues, or, as Zeccola
contends, that the parties were using the time it ultimately
would take to sell out the Hampton Pointe project in order to
predict total wages during a sell-out phase whose future duration
was not fixed or known.

Zeccola's interpretation of the proposal

as no more than a calculation based on the estimated period of
the sell-out phase is supported by the proposal's estimate that
14

Lindsey would also earn commissions from the sale of "18 homes."
Id.

At best, the statement "calculated on 18 month's" could mean

either that the salary was calculated based on an estimated, but
yet unknown, eighteen month sell-out phase or that it is an offer
of employment for eighteen months.0

Thus, it is ambiguous and we

believe such ambiguity in the written description of the parties'
agreement on a term is fatal to Lindsey's case because of
Delaware's "heavy presumption" in favor of employment at-will.
To establish an agreed upon eighteen month term of
employment, Lindsey is wholly dependent on an ambiguous written
statement whose interpretation is in turn dependent on the
resolution of a conflict in oral testimony.

In Delaware all the

provisions of an employment contract must be clearly expressed in
writing to create an employment agreement that is not one for
employment at-will.

Crabtree was decided under New York law and

it is not controlling because Delaware's general adherence to
Restatement principles is modified by a strong presumption in
favor of employment at-will which affects Lindsey's case.

We do

not believe the notation "calculated on 18 month's" refers to the
length of Lindsey's employment with the clarity we believe is
needed to avoid Delaware's presumption in favor of construing
employment contracts as contracts for employment at-will.
Lindsey also argues that partial performance of her
contract with Zeccola brings it within the statute of frauds'

0

There is no evidence suggesting that Lindsey would continue to
be employed by Zeccola after all the Hampton Pointe homes were
sold.
15

exception for contracts evidenced by part performance.

In

rejecting Lindsey's part performance argument the district court
distinguished Quillen v. Sayers, 482 A.2d 744 (Del. 1984).
Lindsey argues that the district court erred in drawing that
distinction.

In Quillen the Delaware Supreme Court recognized "a

well settled general exception to . . . the statute of frauds
[which] exists when there is evidence of actual part performance
of an oral agreement" and applied the exception to an oral
agreement concerning a mortgage foreclosure.
(citations omitted).

Id. at 747

The district court distinguished Quillen

because Quillen enforced an oral agreement between a buyer and
seller of land.

It concluded that the statute of frauds'

exception for part performance of contracts does not extend to
employment contracts.

Lindsey, slip op. at 9 (citing Hull v.

Brandywine Fibre Prods. Co., 121 F. Supp. 108, 114 (D. Del.
1954)) ("It is . . . uncontroverted that partial performance of
services under an oral contract not to be performed within a year
does not remove the contract from the operation of the Statute of
Frauds so as to affect the portion of services not performed.").
In Hull the plaintiff alleged his former employer
breached an oral employment agreement for a five year term by
terminating plaintiff after three years.

Plaintiff argued the

statute of frauds did not apply because plaintiff had partially
performed the contract when he worked for three of the five
years.

Hull, 121 F. Supp. at 114.

The argument rejected in Hull

illustrates the difficulty of applying the partial performance
exception to determine whether an employment contract falls
16

within the statute of frauds.

"'The act relied on as part

performance should be such as would not have been done
independent of [the] contract or agreement . . . because as you
are from the act performed to infer a contract, it must therefore
be an act of that description, which will not admit any other
inference.'"

Durand v. Snedeker, 177 A.2d 649, 653 (Del. Ch.

1962) (quoting Houston v. Townsend, 1 Del. Ch. 416 (1833), aff'd,
1 Harr. 532 (1835)).

When the duration of an employment contract

is not specified in writing, the partial performance exception
assumes the fact at issue and allows any employee who claims an
oral employment contract for a term in excess of one year to
avoid the statute of frauds without written proof of the
contract's duration.

This is precisely what the statute of

frauds' provision requiring a writing before employment contracts
in excess of one year will be enforced is intended to prevent:
[T]o allow the fact that an employee worked
and was paid for part of that year to act as
such a bar [to application of the statute of
frauds] would make the relevant provision of
the statute of frauds totally meaningless.
Any contract where the employee had started
work and received a paycheck would be
protected from the application of the
statute. . . . A check stub or even a signed
paycheck indicates nothing except what a
particular employee has been paid for a
particular period. It does not act as a
contract to pay the employee the same amount
for even the next pay period, much less for
an entire year. . . .

17

Lessman v. Universal Spray Applications, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 679,
681 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (quoting Mapes v. Kalva Corp., 386 N.E.2d
148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)).
Lindsey, in arguing that the district court should not
have distinguished Quillen, refers us to other Delaware cases
applying the partial performance exception to disputes between
buyers and sellers of real estate that do not involve their
contracts of sale.
(Del. 1975).

She cites Nepa v. Marta, 348 A.2d 182, 185

In Nepa the Delaware Supreme Court considered

whether a real estate broker was entitled to a sales commission
and rejected the defendant's statute of frauds defense by
applying the statute's exception for partial performance and
alternately relying on a determination that "the terms of any
such agreement could be performed within a year."
at 185.

Nepa, 348 A.2d

Nepa concerns contracts to pay a real estate broker a

commission.

It does not concern Delaware's statute of frauds

relating to employment contracts.
Lindsey also relies on John Julian Const. Co. v.
Monarch Builders, Inc., 306 A.2d 29 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973), aff'd
on other grounds, 324 A.2d 208 (Del. 1974).

It too did not deal

with the statute of frauds covering employment contracts.

In

Monarch a judgment creditor sought payment from stockholders who
had succeeded to the assets of a dissolved debtor corporation.
The Delaware Superior Court held the statute of frauds did not
prevent the plaintiff from seeking payment on the stockholders'
oral promise that they would assume the debtor's liabilities,
because "it clearly appears that the assumption of liability--if
18

it in fact included the liability to [the plaintiff]--has been
partially performed."

Id. at 34.

Delaware does not apply the partial performance
exception to employment contracts with a fixed duration of over
one year.

Enforcement of oral service contracts for a specified

period exceeding one year is precluded by the statute of frauds,
even if it is possible to perform them within one year.

See

Guyer v. Haveg Corp., 205 A.2d 176, 181 (Del Super. Ct. 1964)
(citing Hull), aff'd, 211 A.2d ___ (Del. 1965).

Lindsey's

argument that her partial performance permits oral proof an
eighteen month contract of employment despite the statute of
frauds fails.
Moreover, even if the partial performance exception
were to apply to oral contracts of employment, Lindsey's argument
would still founder against Delaware's already discussed heavy
presumption in favor of employment at-will.

As we have

demonstrated, that presumption requires Lindsey to present clear
and convincing evidence of all the essential terms of the
eighteen month employment contract she is trying to enforce.
Durand, 177 A.2d at 652.

See

Both state and federal courts applying

Delaware law continue to follow Hull and so will we.

See, e.g.,

Behr Salyard & Partners, L.P. v. Leach, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9584, *32 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1992) (no partial performance
exception to statute of limitations in case involving purported
ten-year contract to form leveraged buyout fund under Hull).
reject Lindsey's arguments and will affirm the part of the

19

We

district court's order granting summary judgment against her on
her claim that Zeccola breached her employment contract.0

0

Lindsey argues Zeccola admitted that a contract existed in
depositions and in the course of their negotiations over her
employment. She contends these admissions, coupled with the
terms of employment shown by the documents she produced, are an
adequate substitute for the written memorandum required by the
statute of frauds. This argument is made for the first time on
appeal. Therefore, we will not address it at this time. Frank
v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover,
Lindsey gives no citations to the record showing the alleged
admission(s). Zeccola denies he made them.
20

IV.

The Statute of Limitations Issue

Lindsey also claims a sales commission from Zeccola for
a home she arranged to sell while working for him.0

The district

court also entered summary judgment against her on this claim,
concluding it was barred by a one year statute of limitations.
Lindsey contends the district court should have applied a three
year statute of limitations.

We agree with Lindsey.

The relevant three year statute of limitations
provides, in relevant part:
§ 8106. Actions subject to 3 year
limitation.
No action . . . based on a promise . . .
shall be brought after the expiration of 3
years from the accruing of the cause of such
action . . . .

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8106 (1975).

The relevant one-year

statute of limitations provides:
§ 8111. Work, labor or personal services.
No action for recovery upon a claim for
wages, salary, or overtime for work, labor or
personal services performed, or for damages
(actual, compensatory or punitive, liquidated
or otherwise), or for interest or penalties
resulting from the failure to pay any such
claim, or for any other benefits arising from
such work, labor or personal services
performed or in connection with any such
0

Although the remaining claim is less than $50,000, the district
court retains diversity jurisdiction. When diversity exists at
the time the case is filed, it is not affected by the dismissal
of one of the claims even though the amount recoverable on the
remaining claim is less than the required $50,000. Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. T & D Cottage Auto Parts & Serv., Inc., 705
F.2d 685, 687 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d
280, 285 (3d Cir. 1959)).
21

action, shall be brought after the expiration
of one year from the accruing of the cause of
action on which such action is based.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8111 (1975).
In concluding that the one year statute of limitations
applied, the district court stated, "[t]he critical date to focus
upon is the date when the work was performed, not the date when
plaintiff could be paid."

Lindsey, slip op. at 12.

The court

reasoned Lindsey completed her work on May 3, 1990 when she sold
the home and her claim was time-barred under section 8111 because
approximately two years had passed before she filed suit.

We

think the court erred.
The district court relied principally on dicta in Brown
v. Colonial Chevrolet Co., 249 A.2d 439, 441 (Del. Super. Ct.
1968):
The one-year statute applies to claims
based on work or services that have been
completed, even though the work may have
originally been undertaken on the strength of
a promise. Since the services have been
completed, the action is based upon the
service performed rather than on the original
promise. The three-year statute applies to
claims based on work or services not yet
completed as to which a promise has been
made. Since the work remains uncompleted, an
action with respect to such work is
necessarily based upon the underlying
promise.

In Brown, however, the Delaware Superior Court held that the
three year statute of limitations applied.

Brown had sought a

promised year-end bonus for work which had not yet been performed
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because he was terminated before the end of the year.

The court

reasoned "[t]he suit here is for what would have been earned had
the employment continued rather than for something already
earned."

Id.
In Delaware "the general rule is that a broker may

recover a commission only when he is the procuring cause of a
consummated transaction."

B-H, Inc. v.

"Industrial America,"

Inc., 253 A.2d 209, 213 (Del. 1969); see also Nepa, 348 A.2d at
184.

A broker is not entitled to a commission until the sale

actually takes place.

A.I.C. Ltd. v. Mapco Petroleum Inc., 711

F. Supp. 1230, 1242 (D. Del. 1989), aff'd without opinion, 888
F.2d 1378 (3d Cir. 1989).
Section 8106 applies to actions based on a promise.
Zeccola allegedly promised to pay Lindsey a commission for any
home that she sold.

It was not certain if or when Lindsey would

be paid because the May 3, 1990 sale agreement was contingent
upon the Guptas' ability to obtain financing.
before the sale was finalized.

Lindsey was fired

Delaware law did not entitle her

to a commission until the settlement took place.

Her right to

payment did not accrue until after her employment was terminated.
A real estate broker's duties in connection with a sale do not
end with the signing of the sales agreement, but often continue
until, and sometimes after, settlement.
We believe Delaware case law supports application of
the three year statute of limitations to Lindsey's claim for a
commission.

In Nepa the Delaware Supreme Court applied the three

year statute of limitations to an action for a broker's
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commission.

Nepa, 348 A.2d at 184.

Zeccola's attempt to

distinguish Nepa on the ground that it involved an independent
broker rather than an employee does not persuade us.
not suing for back wages.
for a commission.

Lindsey is

She, like the broker in Nepa, is suing

Her receipt of a weekly salary is not

dispositive on the issue of which statute of limitations applies
to her demand that her employer perform its promise to pay her
commission on sales she procured after the sales were later
consummated.

If it were, we would have to treat Lindsey's right

to the commission she was promised as a part of her weekly wage.
We do not think it was.
As the district court recognized in an earlier case,
there may sometimes be an overlap between the two statutes:
There is seeming overlapping of [sections
8106 and 8111] because nearly every claim for
wages is based upon an underlying promise,
express or implied, to pay the wages. The
two sections have been reconciled by the
Supreme Court of Delaware in Goldman v.
Braunstein's, 240 A.2d 577 (Del. Supr. 1968).
There the court distinguished between an
action for wages for services already
performed to which section 8111 is relevant,
and an action based on a contract for its
breach prior to performance for which section
8106 is controlling. This distinction
between the coverage of sections 8106 and
8111 is clearly explained by Judge Stiftel in
Brown v. Colonial Chevrolet, 249 A.2d 439,
441 (Del. Super. 1968).

Wilmington Housing Auth. v. Rocky Marciano Constr. Co., 407
F. Supp. 228, 232 (D. Del. 1976).

The Delaware Supreme Court has

concluded that any doubt as to which statute of limitations
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applies should be resolved in favor of the longer period.
v. Sacks, 314 A.2d 194, 196 (Del. 1973).

Sonne

Thus, we believe

Delaware case law also indicates, on the record now before us,
that the three year statute should be applied to Lindsey's claim
for a commission.
Brown itself is consistent with the Delaware Supreme
Court's conclusion that section 8111 applies "to claims arising
out of services [already] performed," while section 8106 applies
to claims arising or ripening after the employment ended. Goldman
v. Braunstein's, Inc., 240 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1968) (suit for
breach of employment contract for damages for future services
subject to three year statute of limitations); see also Advocat
v. Nexus Indus., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 328, 334 (D. Del. 1980)
(three year statute of limitations applied to action for fraud
and negligent misrepresentation regarding alleged promises made
by employer for future pension benefits).

Applying the three

year statute of limitations, the court in Goldman reasoned "any
recoverable loss . . . arose upon or after termination of the
employer-employee relationship."

Goldman, 240 A.2d at 578. Both

Goldman and Advocat involved an employer/employee relationship.
Nevertheless, because their claims were for promises of future
payments, they fell within section 8106 rather than 8111.
Still other cases on future payments consistently hold
that section 8106 applies to actions seeking payment for services
by a licensed broker, attorney or other independent contractor.
Compare Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 579 F. Supp. 690,
702 (D. Del. 1984) (attorneys fees), aff'd without opinion, 746
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F.2d 1466 (3d Cir. 1984); cf. Nepa, 348 A.2d at 184 (applying
three year statute of limitations in action seeking broker's
commission) with Sorensen v. The Overland Corp., 142 F. Supp.
354, 360 (D. Del. 1956) (right to indemnity was benefit of
employment as officer or director of corporation, therefore one
year statute applied), aff'd, 242 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1957).0
Considering the Delaware Supreme Court's instruction
that courts sitting in that state should apply the longest
statute of limitations in case of doubt, we think Lindsey's
claim, like those of independent contractors who are normally
paid after their services are rendered, falls under section 8106
rather than section 8111.

Accordingly, we hold Lindsey's

commission claim is not time-barred and we will reverse the part
of the district court's order granting summary judgment against
Lindsey's claim for a sales commission and remand for further
proceedings.0
0

We are not unmindful of the district court's statement in Aero
Serv. Corp. v. E. S. Gordy, 109 A.2d 393, 394 (Del. Super. Ct.
1954) that "[t]he very language of [section 8111] demonstrates
that it has reference to the claims of servants, or members of
the laboring classes and salaried employees," as opposed to
independent contractors whose fees normally do not arise a week
at a time but rather when their work is completed. Id. (applying
three year statute of limitation to action for payment of
services of independent contractor). We do not believe, however,
the distinction between a promise to pay an independent
contractor for services and a promise to pay an employee a
commission in addition to the employee's regularly accruing wages
is controlling.
0
Lindsey also argues section 8111 is tolled because Zeccola
actively concealed her entitlement to a commission. This
argument is also presented for the first time on appeal. In any
event, we need not consider it because of our conclusion that the
three year statute of limitation applies and Lindsey's claim for
a commission was therefore timely filed.
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V.

Conclusion

We will affirm the part of the district court's order
that granted summary judgment to Zeccola on Lindsey's claims for
breach of an eighteen month employment contract, wrongful
discharge and emotional distress.

We will reverse that part of

the district court's order granting Zeccola summary judgment on
Lindsey's claim for a sales commission and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Susan R. Lindsey v. M.A. Zeccola & Sons, Incorporated, a Delaware
Corporation; M.A. Zeccola
No. 93-7426
BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting.
I join in Part IV of the opinion of the court. However,
I dissent from Part III for two reasons.

First, I believe that

the majority has construed the requirements of Delaware's statute
of frauds much too rigorously; a memorandum need not be as
complete, precise and detailed as the majority suggests to
satisfy the statute.

Second, the majority has compounded this

error by conflating with the statute of frauds Delaware's strict
jurisprudence on employment-at-will unnecessarily raising the
barrier to suit even higher.
I agree with appellants that the statute of frauds is
fully satisfied here by the contract proposal written in
Zeccola's longhand and by the other written documents.

All that

the statute of frauds requires is that the writings reasonably
identify the subject matter of the contract.

Restatement Second

of Contracts, § 131(a) (1981) (quoted by majority typescript at
7-8).

The writing need not set out all the details of the

contract; only the "essential terms" of unperformed promises must
be stated.

Restatement (Second), § 131(c) (quoted by majority,

typescript at 7-8).

Exhibit "B2," written in Zeccola's own hand,

sets out all the unperformed promises of the defendants: an 18month term of employment, a salary of roughly $647.00 per week,
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health insurance, and the payment of commissions.0

Although

Exhibit B2 was not signed by Zeccola, signed payroll cards, as in
the Restatement example, see majority typescript at 9, referred
to the same agreement as Exhibit B2, evidenced by the fact that
they contained essentially the same terms.0

Thus, the signatures

on the payroll cards apply to Exhibit B2 which contained the
essential 18 month term of employment.
In short, the purpose of the statute of frauds is to
require objective evidence of a contract in order to prevent and
avoid fraud so that parties and witnesses cannot just make up
claims out of whole cloth.
747 (Del. Supr. 1984).

See Quillen v. Sayers, 482 A.2d 744,

The statutory purpose was satisfied here.

The statute does not require a comprehensive memorial.

The

remaining details may be fleshed out (and would have been here)
by the testimony and by documents other than those signed by the
"party sought to be charged."

Only at that point does Delaware's

presumption in favor of employment at will become relevant in
evaluating whether, based on all of the evidence, defendant
breached the agreement.

0

The law does not require writings on points not in dispute.
Restatement (Second), § 131(c).
0
The differences in pay between the payroll cards and exhibit B2,
see majority opinion at 11-12, were so insignificant that they do
not cast doubt on the conclusion that the writings referred to
the same agreement.
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